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In the context of concerns around healthcare safety, questions of knowledge – what is known, when, 
by whom, and how they know it – are critical.  In this article, I explore these questions from a 
sociology of knowledge perspective, which relates the content of knowledge to the context in which 
it is developed and employed, analysing the report of an inquiry into healthcare failures at a 
maternity unit in the UK.  In my reading, the inquiry report details a struggle for understanding 
around how practice should be viewed; from the outside the incidents that occurred represented 
systemic failures in safety, but from the inside (for a considerable period of time) they were 
considered an unfortunate, but coincidental, series of events. The positions from where these 
perspectives emerge are important in shaping the content of knowledge, and can explain much 
about how understanding develops.   
Such ‘situated knowledge’ is the subject of much scholarship across many fields of qualitative social 
science.  I draw insights from science and technology studies, anthropology, sociology of health and 
illness, sociological studies of disasters, and from ethnographic methodological literature to develop 
a discussion around the located character of knowledge, perception and interpretation that explains 
how different perspectives on events can develop and to illustrate their safety implications.  I then 
focus on events that formed the subject of the Morecambe Bay Investigation, an independent 
inquiry chaired by Dr Bill Kirkup into failures of care in the maternity unit of Furness General 
Hospital.  My focus is not only to explain the co-existence of contrasting views on the sufficiency of 
care, but to explore how one version comes to predominate, and what it takes to overturn that view. 
I draw on principles of narrative analysis to analyse the inquiry report, tracing how descriptions of 
events weaken or gather force as they travel through different forums, processes, are presented to 
various audiences, with shifts in context changing the way events are viewed. Thus, I examine the 
sociology of knowledge in establishing failures in care; the claims that are made – their positionality, 
weighting, authority, mobility and audience – as different descriptions of events circulate. 
 
The located character of knowledge and its relevance for risk and safety in healthcare 
As Goodwin (1994: 606) states ‘All vision is perspectival’. We do not all see the same thing.  What is 
seen, understood, how it is described, and from what or whose perspective are issues central to 
ethnography and there has long been methodological debate around the virtues of insider and 
outsider perspectives. The outsider has the advantage of critical distance, taking nothing for granted, 
resisting assumptions (Hirshauer, 2006; Naaeke et al., 2011).  The insider’s view is rich in local 
knowledge and interpretation.  As May and Pattilo-McCoy (2000) explain, their different degrees of 
familiarity with the setting led to perceptual inconsistencies reflecting their personal and intellectual 
backgrounds.  For example, the native Chicagoan’s knowledge of local gangs allowed for 
meticulously detailed descriptions, rich in meaning, whereas the non-native’s fieldnotes of the same 
scenes demonstrated curiosity but contained little detail and interpretation.   
Perception is also structured through activities and work, which give rise to varying interpretations.  
Goodwin’s (1994:606) concept of ‘professional vision’ sheds light on how professionals learn to see 
and understand phenomena in professionally relevant ways.  Analysing the 1992 Rodney King trial, 
in which a recording of four white police officers assaulting an African-American motorist stopped 
for speeding was used by both sides to contest the opposing side’s account, Goodwin (1994:606) 
argues ‘the ability to see a meaningful event is not a transparent, psychological process but instead a 
socially situated activity accomplished through the deployment of a range of historically constituted 
discursive practices’.  These practices include ‘coding’, using a classification scheme to structure 
perception and transform the event into an object of knowledge salient to the particular profession, 
 3 
and ‘highlighting’ which makes specific features of a complex perceptual field notable by marking 
them out.  Using these techniques, the defence described the events, not as a man on the ground 
being beaten, but as movements by the man recognisable as aggression.  Goodwin therefore 
situates perception, not in the individual mind but in disciplinary activities designed to make 
significant features of a phenomena recognisable to others.  Focusing on how work allocates 
different information to professionals depending on their role, Anspach (1987) also takes up the 
issue of how professions develop their particular perspectives.  She analysed decision-making in 
neonatal intensive care and argued that the organisation acts as an ‘ecology of knowledge’.  She 
found that doctors had limited contact with the infants and relied heavily on diagnostic technology 
whereas nurses’ perspectives were informed by perceptual cues developed through continuous 
contact with the infants.  Consequently, physicians and nurses differed systematically in their view of 
babies’ prognoses (Anspach, 1987).  The point to note is the way one’s position in the organisation 
serves as an interpretative lens.  Developing these ideas about how the organisation acts on the 
content of knowledge, Waring  (2009) describes the transformations that occur as knowledge travels 
through organisational processes.  Clinicians’ initial verbal accounts of safety incidents reflect the 
complexity of clinical work, and understanding of events develops through reflection and collegial 
discussion with experienced colleagues.  In formal written reports, descriptions were supplemented 
with further actions to justify actions or deflect blame.  Once received by risk managers, descriptions 
were stripped of technical and contextual detail to conform to database classification systems.   
The sociology of knowledge holds important implications for risk and safety, and for the case 
examined below, Vaughan’s (2016 [1996]) concept of ‘normalisation of deviance’ is particularly 
illuminating.  She traced the factors that produced a cultural disposition among NASA engineers and 
managers towards the rationalisation of risk, and how a pattern of decision-making that repeatedly 
led to the normalisation of deviant findings gradually moved practice away from safety standards 
and towards disaster.  Vaughan (2016:409) says: 
the Challenger launch is a story of how people who worked together developed patterns 
that blinded them to the consequences of their actions.  It is not only about the 
development of norms but about the incremental expansion of normative boundaries; how 
small changes – new behaviours that were slight deviations from the normal course of 
events – gradually became the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance.  No 
rules were violated, there was no intent to do harm. 
By ‘normalization of deviance’ Vaughan does not mean becoming accustomed to wrongful 
behaviour, rather, she points to the ‘prerational forces’ such as organisational priorities, that shape 
the options of a decision.  She further explains how the uncertainty of engineering knowledge, a 
belief in technological redundancy, and the endorsement of decisions through official channels 
normalised signals of potential danger, resulting in mistakes with catastrophic consequences.  
Emphasising the locality of such perspectives, Dekker (2011:39) further suggests that from the 
inside, drift away from safety standards is invisible: 
From the outside, such fine-tuning constitutes incremental experimentation in uncontrolled 
settings.  On the inside, incremental nonconformity is an adaptive response to scarce 
resources and production goals.  This means that departures from the norm become the 
norm.  Seen from inside people’s own work, deviations become compliant behaviour.   
The message is that If work is routinely accomplished in ways that are different to safety policies, 
this is not deviance, it is normal.   
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The literature above all emphasise the located and embodied nature of knowledge, and that as 
knowledge is inescapably positioned and structured through activities and work, this gives rise to 
varying interpretations and multiple perspectives.  How events are viewed, interpreted and 
described are intrinsically connected to the positioning of individuals and the communities to which 
they belong.  Different professions develop knowledge of varying characters, and the organisation 
acts to distribute different forms of knowledge to different groups of staff, and to mediate and 
transform accounts of events.  The sociology of knowledge holds important implications for the 
safety of healthcare, in particular how parameters of safe practice can shift, producing a cultural 
disposition toward accommodating anomalies and rationalising them as ‘normal’. These arguments 
raise concerns about how serious incidents are interpreted, how failures of care established, and 
how the prevailing interpretation of events may change.  
 
Methodological approach and case-study selection 
The analysis below stems from an interest in sociological approaches to safety in healthcare and 
from a familiarity with the location.  Being a social scientist at the local medical school, one who 
teaches and researches patient safety, provided good reason for reading The Report of the 
Morecambe Bay Investigation (2015).  On reading the report, it became clear that events 
documented within the Report related to the concerns I pose above – how incidents with serious 
human consequences are understood when elevated levels of risk become accepted, the practices 
that produce these levels of risk become normalised, and how failure or substandard care is 
established.  
The events I examine relate to a ‘cluster’ of five ‘serious untoward incidents’ (SUIs) involving patients 
on the maternity unit at Furness General Hospital (part of Morecambe Bay NHS Trust) during 2008.  
These events and others became the subject of an inquiry in 2013 and the inquiry report (Kirkup, 
2015) is my primary source of data for the analysis below.  The report covers more than this cluster 
of incidents, however, how these incidents should be viewed – whether they were related – was 
pivotal in establishing whether there were systemic failures in care.  
The five SUIs were:  
1) A baby damaged by the effects of perinatal hypoxia after pre-term delivery 
2) A maternal death due to high blood pressure, thought to have been unavoidable.   
3) A maternal death due to an amniotic fluid embolism, thought to have been unavoidable, and 
the death of the baby due to shortage of oxygen   
4) An intrapartum stillbirth due to shortage of oxygen in labour  
5) The death of a baby from sepsis following prolonged rupture of membranes and maternal 
illness 
These events all happened within one year and the inquiry found in each case care was seriously 
deficient.  Prior to the inquiry, numerous investigations were conducted and although some 
criticisms where levelled at the Trust, a conclusion of systemic failures in care was resisted. In my 
reading, the inquiry report depicts an intense struggle as to how standards of care should be viewed, 
and it is revealing (and sometimes surprising) to see which description of events holds in which 
circumstances.  As the report documents, from the inside: 
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staff considered that there had not been failures of care and that they were being unfairly 
criticised.  This was most graphically illustrated by the comment made to us by an 
interviewee as she left the room that “sometimes bad things happen in maternity – people 
just have to accept it”. (Kirkup, 2015:17) 
Yet from the outside: 
deaths that occur during labour to a baby that had developed normally, described as 
intrapartum stillbirths: these should not happen, and their uncommon occurrence must be 
regarded as a serious incident requiring investigation.  We were distressed to find that not 
only were intrapartum stillbirths a too-regular occurrence at FGH, they seem to us to have 
been treated with far less concern that we expected, and as a result opportunities were 
missed to identify substandard practice. (Kirkup, 2015:174) 
These quotes represent the polarised views from the inside and outside.  To explore how the 
prevailing interpretation of events shifted from the inside to the outside, I have drawn extracts from 
The Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation that explain the different positions on the adequacy 
of care, and the processes by which those positions were strengthened or weakened.  In line with 
the principles of narrative analysis, I constructed a chronology of events, preserving the sequences 
of action and the way participants negotiate language and narrative genres (Riessman, 2016).  
Narrative analysis maintains that it is useful to question i) In what context was this account 
generated, ii) why was the story told that way and iii) what did the story accomplish for the speaker 
(Riessman, 2016).  A narrative approach considers both the author and audience, includes analysis of 
the local context – setting, questioner, listener – and positions stories, talk, and descriptions within a 
broader dialogue (Riessman, 2016).  These issues are central to the analysis below and sit 
comfortably within a sociology of knowledge perspective. In particular, how perception is structured 
by one’s position, what that position enables one to see, and what it blinds one to, offer an entry 
point to thinking about how a belief in the adequacy of care can be maintained in the face of 
growing evidence to the contrary.  Moreover, examining descriptions as artefacts that are shaped 
and circulate through many forums and processes, allows insight into the organisational practices 
that promote and obstruct acknowledgement of failures in care.   
Given the emphasis on how events are described and the primary source of data – an inquiry report 
– there is need to reflect on inquiries as processes of knowledge construction, and inquiry reports as 
texts that deliver a definitive version of events.  First, in circumstances of public discontent, inquiries 
are said to serve a political agenda, conveying a sense of decisive action, providing reassurance, and 
rebuilding public confidence (Greer and McLaughlin, 2017; Timmins, 2019; Walshe, 2019). 
Consequently, Boudes and Laroche (2009:79) indicate the need to avoid positioning the reports as 
‘unbiased windows’ on events.  They highlight how a seemingly objective chronology of events 
entails choices that suggest a storyline: other start and end points, the inclusion of some 
occurrences and not others, may cast the events in a different light.  Further, the insertion of 
comments and the way data is presented, for example with mitigation or challenge, distributes 
accountabilities and informs how evidence should be interpreted (Boudes and Laroche, 2009; 
Goodwin, 2018).   
For these reasons, I searched the inquiry’s open interview records for context on the events and 
interview excerpts detailed below, and for further relevant details not included in the inquiry report.  
A major limitation of this source of data is that, for reasons of confidentiality, discussion of specific 
cases of patient care occurred private sessions and are not publicly available.  I have also drawn on a 
book recounting personal experiences of the events and some media reports.  These additional 
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sources were used to challenge and enrich the developing arguments (Squire, 2011).  The point to 
note is that while all sources claim some authoritative knowledge of ‘what happened’, they are 
based on different forms of knowledge and access the events in different ways.  None can be taken 
as a straightforward account of ‘what happened’. Multiple versions of ‘what happened’, however, 
does not mean they are all equal, and I am interested in how the shifts in consensus occurred and 
what that means for differentially positioned individuals in acknowledging failures of care. 
I will now discuss, first, how the view from the inside – that the 2008 SUIs were unconnected – was 
constructed and sustained before moving on to explore the work it took to overturn this view, and 
to have an inquiry commissioned; a move which cemented the view that the events were connected 
and did represent systemic failures in care. 
 
Constructing the view from the inside: descriptive practices of internal investigations  
The occurrence of a SUI automatically triggers an internal investigation.  In theory, this process at 
Morecambe Bay involved a review by the clinical director and the head of midwifery.  In practice the 
review was mostly undertaken by the maternity risk manager, and the clinical director was not 
routinely involved (Kirkup, 2015).  The maternity risk manager was a senior midwife, a supervisor of 
midwivesi, and also a staff representative (formerly a Royal College of Midwifery union official) – a 
combination of positions that prioritises support and advocacy for midwives.  The inquiry report 
suggests the conflicts of interest this combination of roles produced informed the maternity risk 
manager’s sympathetic perspective and shaped the views of those around her:  
We believe that this [conflict of interest] was significant in the events that developed, not 
only in encouraging the group think amongst midwives that all was well but also in 
promoting a view at more senior levels that there were no systemic problems in the unit. 
(Kirkup, 2015:180) 
The maternity risk manager is positioned as central to maintaining the status quo, reassuring those 
above and below that all is well. Hutter (2005:72) points out that organisational barriers to seeing 
exist, such as a reluctance to move bad news upwards through the hierarchy.  But, referring to the 
rules, roles and authority relations that inform perceptions of ‘appropriateness’, Vaughan (2016:197) 
highlights the ‘prerational dynamic’ by which organisational arrangements determine the range of 
choices people see as rational in a given situation. Vaughan’s emphasis on the ‘pre-rational’ is a 
reminder that reluctance to convey bad news may not operate on a conscious level. 
The inquiry report goes on to criticise the quality of internal investigations and the quote below 
indicates the importance of the position from which these descriptions emerge: 
We were distressed to hear and see evidence that the investigation of maternal deaths was 
also sometimes superficial and rudimentary, and failed to identify clear examples of 
substandard care.  In some cases, this reflected an over-reliance on poorly completed 
records, when it would have been evident from a conversation with the relatives of the 
deceased that warning signs were missed some time in advance of the subsequent acute 
deterioration of the patient’s condition. (Kirkup, 2015:175) 
Instead of identifying failures in care, internal investigations were dominated by the comparatively 
benign criticism of the need to keep better records. The dependence on such records, noted by the 
inquiry, again points to the limited view these investigations took.  Patients and families had no 
input at this stage and there appears to be only a limited role for other healthcare professionals.  So, 
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the first move in knowledge-making about these incidents was the internal investigations led by an 
individual deeply situated within the midwifery community whose commitment to supporting 
midwives is evidenced by her combination of roles.  The findings of the internal investigations reflect 
these commitments in their refusal to attribute significant fault to midwifery practices. Internal 
investigations, it seems, were superficial and decidedly partisan. 
However, constructing a view that the SUIs did not represent systemic failures in care required a 
further move – that they should not be formally examined together, a move primarily located at 
Trust Board.  Although the Chief Executive insisted the SUIs had repeatedly been discussed together, 
the inquiry found ‘no documentary evidence of any systematic review of the cluster of SUIs in 2008, 
and no record that they were notified to or discussed by the Board’ (Kirkup, 2015:20).  Nevertheless, 
the Chief Executive defended his view of events as unconnected by stating that:  
a connection could be characterised by clinical similarity of presentation or complications, or 
involvement of the same clinicians, or because they all demonstrated a similar pattern of 
deficit in clinical quality and standards. (Kirkup, 2015:86) 
Superficially, there was no pattern to the 2008 incidents; the events involved different clinicians and 
different things went wrong. It was considered an unfortunate, but unrelated, cluster.  The inquiry 
panel, on the other hand, were astonished that (with one exception discussed below) ‘none of the 
unit clinicians, clinical director or executive directors appeared to have considered that there may 
have been a pattern to the occurrence of these extremely rare events in a small unit.’ (Kirkup, 
2015:175). This lack of curiosity could be explained by the Chief Executive’s comments: 
“I had no reason to believe that anything had happened or changed there that changed the 
overall safety of the Unit.  I was assured by the Head of Midwifery and by the – and by the 
Associate Medical Director that the Unit was safe.  We hadn’t changed anything in terms of 
number of midwives or doctor’s rotas or anything that would have… destabilised it in that 
sense.  So I guess we were as confident as we could be that, you know, that we were dealing 
with something that we thought we understood.” (Kirkup, 2015:87) 
There is a circularity in perception here.  Like the ‘acceptable risk’ procedures Vaughan describes, 
organisational procedures for investigating incidents had been followed and had satisfied questions 
about safety, resulting in knowledge that endorsed the status quo. By limiting the frame of reference 
(each SUI being considered individually) and the sources of information drawn upon (clinical records 
and staff statements), internal investigations produced a perspective where failures in care were 
held outside the field of view.   The Chief Executive’s comments, demonstrate Anspach’s (1987) 
‘ecology of knowledge’, wherein what is known depends on what sources of information are seen, 
and what is seen depends on one’s position within the organisation. Even at the head of the 
organisation, one’s position shapes what one sees and understands, and this understanding circles 
back in the form of resistance to further investigation, discussed below. 
 
Descriptions under scrutiny: sustaining the ‘unconnected’ view  
The view that events were unconnected did not go unchallenged.  Although there was widespread 
lack of curiosity about a connection between the 2008 SUIs, it was not a perspective held by all.  In 
2008, an obstetric consultant attempted to show connections between the fourth 2008 SUIs – an 
intrapartum stillbirth – and an earlier neonatal death in 2004.  He: 
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wrote a letter identifying some of the deficiencies that had contributed to the disastrous 
outcome, drawing a parallel with the early neonatal death in 2004 … and warning that in his 
view further tragedies would ensue unless action followed.  His letter was addressed to the 
Clinical Director [of Obstetrics and Gynaecology], and copied to the Trust’s Medical 
Director….  He did not receive a reply, and we could find no evidence that his concerns were 
taken seriously, acted upon or investigated. (Kirkup, 2015:16) 
It is puzzling why this account had so little effect; it carried the hallmarks of authoritative knowledge 
being informed by local and professional knowledge.  The lack of response shifts attention from the 
author to its audience. As Hirshauer (2006) points out, the fate of a description is settled by the 
reader. Perhaps the lack of effect was because the letter was circulated to a limited, and crucially, 
internal audience.  When questioned by the inquiry team, the Medical Director had no recollection 
of receiving the letter, despite stating he always took a formal approach to handling concerns 
(Morecambe Bay Investigation: Open Interview Records,  p31), and the Chief Executive, who was 
later alerted to the existence of the letter, could not recall any response to the concerns raised 
(Open Interview Records, p50-1).  This account was also in the context of exceedingly ‘dysfunctional 
working relationships’ between obstetricians and midwives.  In the open interview records, the Chief 
Executive alludes to the letter covering ‘relationship issues’, and elsewhere in the inquiry report, the 
dysfunctional relationships receive considerable attention; midwives are portrayed as fiercely 
protective of their ‘normal childbirth’ boundaries (and the autonomy it confers), and the 
obstetricians are cast as complacent, content to be called and dismissed as the midwives see fit (see 
Goodwin, 2018).  In this context, it may be that safety concerns were interpreted as a product of 
persistent interprofessional differences. 
A more persistent challenge came from outside the organisation.  Following the death of a baby 
from sepsis, the father (Mr James Titcombe) made a complaint to the Chief Executiveii.  It resulted in 
an external investigation by a midwife, an obstetrician and a paediatrician (the Chandler, Hopps and 
Farrier report) into the care of Joshua Titcombe, and a review by the supervisor of midwives.  The 
supervisor of midwives investigation was organised through a professional midwifery structure and 
intended to be an external process, however, in this case the investigating supervisor of midwives 
was internal to the Trust.  The inquiry report identifies conflicting outcomes of these two 
investigations; the external report concluded that opportunities to detect and treat the infection 
before it became life threatening were missed, highlighting deficient monitoring of the baby by 
midwives, whereas the supervisor of midwives’ investigation played down the likelihood that better 
monitoring would have resulted in a different outcome.  These two investigations are both 
descriptions forged through the lens of professional knowledge, but place inside and outside views 
in contest.  The value of an external, professional, and multidisciplinary viewpoint is that it allows for 
comparison between maternity practices here and elsewhere, to see professionally salient details 
but, unaffected by local cultural knowledge, to see them differently, in the awareness that things 
could be otherwise.  
However, while there were external reviews and scrutiny from regulatory bodies, there was still no 
analysis of all five cases together.  Furthermore, action in response to the SUIs supported the view 
inside the Trust that they understood the situation and had taken appropriate measures.  As the 
Chief Executive recalls,  
I was convinced the circumstances were different, and there was a different reason for them 
… at the time, I definitely believed that we had worked out what had gone wrong, or hadn’t 
gone wrong … So I think we had convinced ourselves that we were doing the right things to 
try to put right the issues that had come up from those cases. (Open Interview Records, p8) 
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In February 2009, when the Trust declared the 2008 cluster of SUIs in their application for 
Foundation Trust status (a status that confers more autonomy), one of the regulatory bodies (North 
West Strategic Health Authority) questioned if there was a gap in understanding regarding whether 
the five 2008 incidents were connected, and suggested further investigation.  The Trust 
commissioned another review, however, in setting the terms of reference, they steered the review 
away from examining the cases together and onto governance arrangements.  The Chief Executive 
explains:  
“…I commissioned the report from Pauline Fielding… that was around trying to look at 
clinical governance and – not to review the individual cases, but to come back and say, 
‘Look, in terms of the governance across this patch, what could we do?  What structure 
could we put in place… that would get us past this?” (Kirkup, 2015:87) 
Resistance to an external review of all five cases was based on the conviction that the incidents had 
been investigated, understood, and acted upon.  The perspective of the review, therefore, should be 
on orientated towards the future.  As the Strategic Health Authority officer tells it in the open 
interview records (p29), the Chief Executive explained this framing of the Fielding Report as being to 
examine issues arising from all of the incidents, which she assumed would necessitate a re-
examination of the incidents altogether.  It did not, and this move prevented any connection 
between the incidents from becoming visible.  
 
How the ‘unconnected’ view began to change: relatives’ activism 
In the face of such resistance, it required complaints and other forms of activism by relatives, as well 
as media attention, inquests, and a police investigation to successfully challenge the ‘unconnected’ 
view.  However, it is in relatives’ activism where the bulk of the descriptive work necessary to 
overturn the received view took place.  On receipt of the Chandler, Hopps and Farrier report, a 
contest of views began between Mr Titcombe and the midwives: 
the report was shared with Mr Titcombe, who challenged several aspects, and it became 
clear that there were significant discrepancies between the accounts given by midwives and 
the record made by the Titcombe family shortly before Joshua died. (Kirkup, 2015:170) 
Crucially, the Titcombes made their own record, documenting their first-hand experiences, whereas 
the external review was based on medical records and the midwives’ accounts given to the internal 
investigation. Here, the lines of comparison are between the lay and professional and available 
sources of knowledge; the Titcombe’s account rests on what Hirshauer (2006) calls a naturalistic 
rhetoric of authentication, ‘I was there’, based on direct and close observation, whereas the external 
report can claim the epistemological authority of ‘professional vision’ wherein perception is honed 
to emphasise certain details over others through professional education and training (Goodwin, 
1994).  But given these asymmetries of clinical knowledge the outcome is not what one might 
expect, reflecting May’s (2007) contention that lay/professional analyses of knowledge contests 
should take greater account of the societal context in which shifts in organisational structures and 
the repositioning of patients and healthcare professionals have reshaped the dynamics of 
knowledge.  
The Titcombes’ successful challenge of the midwives’ account bears testimony to the changing 
dynamics of knowledge but there were further inadequacies in the midwives’ account. Initially, they 
had argued that Joshua had not been hypothermic. 
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Only when Mr and Mrs Titcombe presented a convincing account that Joshua had been 
significantly hypothermic on two occasions, an account accepted by the midwives, did their 
version of events change to a universal lack of awareness of the significance of neonatal 
hypothermia. (Kirkup, 2015:18)  
What the Titcombes’ description contained is not documented in the inquiry report, however, in 
Joshua’s Story, a book subsequently written by James Titcombe, he describes how his wife recalled 
two distinct temperature measurements recorded on the observation chart that were hypothermic.  
He also describes the conversations he had with the midwives, and the actions taken to warm 
Joshua up.  These recollections are detailed and precise; there is a persuasive account of Joshua 
being moved into a heated cot with a heater directly over him only for it to be removed when, 
following Mrs Titcombe’s concern, the midwife touched Joshua’s skin and recognised he was too hot 
(Titcombe, 2015). 
On the midwives’ subsequent account, that they were all unaware hypothermia in a neonate was a 
cardinal sign of infection necessitating urgent action, the casting vote is with the audience.  The 
inquiry report, however, gives a steer on how to interpret this account, describing it as 
‘extraordinary’ and noting that ‘many experienced interviewees expressed varying degrees of 
surprise and disbelief’ on hearing it (Kirkup, 2015:18).  The shifting of accounts when challenged, and 
apparent implausibility of the subsequent version of events, did not make for a strong 
epistemological standpoint.  The hospital admitted liability but the Titcombes were not satisfied that 
the hospital had been honest.  Moreover, in relation to the argument being developed here, 
admitting liability in one case, did not represent a pattern and evidence of systemic failures in care.  
Relatives’ activism, then, did not end with letters of complaint; in the Titcombes’ case it also 
involved liaison with Strategic Health Authority, lobbying for an inquest, taking their complaints to 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman who are responsible for making the final decision on 
unresolved disputes, and setting up a campaign group.     
 
 
Inquests and police investigations: Opening up and closing down descriptive spaces 
Of all the activist strategies, the Titcombes’ pursuit of an inquest and their willingness to engage 
with local, national and social media, were particularly consequential. Taking the inquest first, 
Joshua’s death occurred in Newcastle where he had been transferred for highly specialised 
treatment.  However, due to his extremely poor condition on arrival, the coroner regarded the death 
as expected, and thus an inquest unnecessary.  Only after considerable efforts by the Titcombes to 
inform the coroner of events preceding Joshua’s transfer, did he refer the case to the coroner in 
Cumbria. 
The inquest finally took place in June 2011 during which the coroner criticised Trust staff for 
‘collusion in preparation for the inquest and possible destruction of evidence’ (Kirkup, 2015:37).  In 
addition to the collective change in midwives’ accounts over whether Joshua was hypothermic, the 
‘collusion’ refers to some model answers circulated by maternity risk manager in response to 
‘difficult questions’ posed by the Trust solicitor.  The inquiry report notes: 
This distortion of the process underlying an inquest was picked up by the coroner, who 
commented on the similarity of the accounts that he heard from different witnesses and the 
concern that this caused him. (Kirkup, 2015: 19) 
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‘Distortion’ and ‘collusion’, however, is not how the maternity risk manager saw it.  When 
questioned on why she circulated the model answers to staff participating in the inquest, she 
explained that it was to obtain answers for the Trust solicitor, and to give staff the opportunity to 
make amendments and correct inaccuracies, not to coach staff: 
It was never the intention to coach staff to do anything, we never did that.  We just told 
them to tell the truth.  That they would have statements in front of them and they would 
answer questions that the Coroner gave them.  That was certainly not my intention when 
that document was completed and sent back to the solicitor. (Open Interview Records, p49-
52) 
Traditionally, decisions to violate rules have been explained as calculated, amoral choices (Vaughan, 
1999:291) yet Vaughan (2016:408) urges us to ‘wonder about processes that normalise deviance, 
possibly allowing organizational members honestly to view their actions as normal rather than 
deviant.’  Given the maternity risk manager’s unfamiliarity with inquests, her roles within the Trust, 
and her supportive stance towards the midwives, it is possible that the she did not see this 
preparation as violating procedures.  Yet, further doubt was cast on the veracity of the midwives’ 
accounts by the loss of a key observation chart.  So concerned was the coroner at this ‘possible 
destruction of evidence’ (Kirkup, 2015:37) that he issued a rule 43 letter (a report on action 
necessary to prevent further deaths) and this initiated a police investigation.  
Before discussing the police investigation, I would like to briefly consider another inquest as it 
illustrates how they are a process through which descriptions are constructed, circulate and gather 
force.  Regarding the fourth 2008 incident – a stillbirth – the Trust argued that an inquest should not 
take place as a coroner’s legal powers extend only to deaths that follow live births (Kirkup, 
2015:173).  This argument can be read as an attempt to close down space for potential criticism for 
it is here the view from the inside can be publicly scrutinised, and descriptions can gather force or be 
dismantled. Moreover, as coroner’s courts are public proceedings and frequently attended by 
journalists, their conclusions are a matter of public record and may be widely disseminated.  This is a 
space that allows for external reporting.  
Legal processes both open up and close down descriptions.  Above, the preparation for inquests 
solidified the midwives’ account, but its paucity was publicly exposed giving space to alternative 
views.  The police investigation, which was characterised as ‘thorough’ and ‘persistent’ in the inquiry 
report but ended without prosecution, also shaped accounts but in ways that closed down 
subsequent descriptions: 
Police interviews of FGH staff almost all ended with solicitors advising their clients to say 
nothing in addition to their written statement and answer no questions.  … Although the 
majority of present and former staff were helpful and informative when interviewed [in the 
inquiry], some appeared to us much more constrained in answering and stuck doggedly to 
previous lines even when these were difficult to sustain under challenge.  We could not help 
but detect echoes of both the inquests and the police investigation in this approach. (Kirkup, 
2015: 37)  
While the police investigations and the inquests were counterproductive to producing a fuller 
description, importantly, they are external processes that cast a view from the outside, exposing 
concerns and disseminating them widely.   
 
 12 
Increasing external scrutiny: strengthening the view from the outside 
In replacing the dominant ‘unconnected’ view, a tipping point had been reached and events picked 
up pace at this point: the inquests and police investigation prompted further external investigations 
by governance agencies (Monitor and CQC) as well as widespread adverse publicity, two further SUIs 
occurred in 2011 which bore ‘unmistakable similarities to earlier incidents’ (Kirkup, 2015: 38), in 
February 2012 Chief Executive resigned, further Board changes followed, and in September 2013 the 
inquiry was commissioned. 
Throughout all this James Titcombe kept up a regular media presence using social media and 
engaging with national press.  In Joshua’s Story, he describes collaborating with other affected 
parents to establish the campaign ‘Morecambe Bay Inquiry Action’ which involved setting up a 
Facebook group, a website, a launch event filmed by national news media, liaison with members of 
parliament, and ultimately being instrumental in having the inquiry commissioned.  He is quoted in 
the Independent (March 2014) national newspaper as saying: 
For me, social media made the difference.  The spread of people that you can contact, the 
coming together, the working together.  Twitter is an awesome, powerful tool for a campaigner.  
Anybody can ignore one person – you’re just a grieving dad.  If there’s a group of you saying the 
same thing, that’s harder to ignore.  Without social media I don’t think this movement would 
have happened.   
The growing importance of social media in campaigning has been noted elsewhere (see for example, 
Segerberg and Bennet, 2011), here, James Titcombe highlights the collectivity of a description as 
being critical to its effectiveness.  However, while the consensus around failures in care was growing, 
vociferous public debate persisted on both sides.  Many local people joined the campaign, others 
vocally resisted it, arguing that intense negative publicity would close a much-needed maternity 
unit.  Moreover, public debate and publicity came at a cost for all involved; James Titcombe (2015) 
was subject to the anger of local residents and, referring to the constant, conspicuous presence of 
reporters at the hospital, the Chief Executive commented, ‘there were days I’m not sure why the 
midwives turned in for work in Barrow; they were under that much pressure.’ (Open Interview 
Records, p47).  
The inquest, the police investigation, the campaign and media coverage all contributed to increasing 
public suspicion of systemic failures in care, and the inquiry cemented this view.  Over 18 months 
the inquiry examined hospital statistics, case notes, emails, minutes of meetings, internal 
investigation reports, coroner’s reports, external reviews as well as conducting interviews with staff, 
members of regulatory bodies and other professionals associated with the hospital (for further 
discussion of inquiry methods, see Goodwin, 2018).  It concluded that ‘these events represent a 
major failure at almost every level’ (Kirkup, 2015:11).  These were no longer individual cases. 
Regarding the decisiveness of inquiries’ versions of events, there are a number of points to be made.  
First, it has been noted that inquiries construct a ‘univocal and coherent view’ of complex and 
uncertain events (Brown, 2003:96), and that inquiries are structured around discovering the 
objective truth of matters under investigation (Walshe, 2019).  However, this is what inquiries are 
charged do; one version must win, given the terms of the investigation.  Taking the above analysis 
into account, what can be said is that considerable descriptive work had already gone into 
constructing the view that there were systemic failures in care, and an investigation taking place 
years after the events, when the outcomes are known, provides a vantage point not available to 
those inside the Trust at the time of the events.   
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Second, the authority of the inquiry’s account has a number of bases; inquiries are forensic in their 
approach, they adhere to rules governing scientific knowledge production and representation, such 
as making provenance claims around the commissioning of the inquiry, and comprehensively 
detailing the evidence reviewed (Brown, 2003).  The report must narrate an engaging story by using 
direct quotations from witnesses, include large amounts of contextual and micro-situational detail, 
and conform to generally held notions of how people behave in crisis situations (Brown, 2003) being 
informed by current knowledge of safety science and human factors principles (Goodwin, 2018, 
2019).   
Third, credibility is established in large part by the expertise of the inquiry team (Goodwin, 2018), in 
this case being chaired by Dr Bill Kirkup, a medical doctor whose career has included being an 
obstetrician, serving as the Associate Chief Medical Officer for England, and participating in a 
previous inquiry.  He was assisted by experts in Obstetrics, Nursing and Midwifery, Paediatrics and 
Healthcare Law.  But, beyond credentials, the analysis here shows that the inquiry team bring a mix 
of perspectives, being outsider to local knowledge which facilitates questioning of local rationalities, 
but insider to professional knowledge thus bringing a view rich in interpretation on the adequacy of 
professional knowledge and practice.   
Finally, the public nature of the inquiry, and breadth of intended audience, shapes inquiries in 
important ways.  Inquiries are generally commissioned in response to public outcry, and the degree 
to which affected families are involved and kept informed makes them distinct from other forms of 
regulation (Penhale and Manthorpe, 2004).  Moreover, the availability of the report, the methods of 
investigation and sources of information to interested members of the public and national press 
potentially allows the weight of public judgement to play into the consensus shifting from inside to 
outside views.   
 
Conclusion: descriptions, sociology of knowledge, and establishing failures in healthcare  
Social science scholarship has often made a distinction between description and explanation with 
description being comparatively undervalued (for a discussion of this see Marcus, Love and Best, 
2016) yet for Latour, a description’s ability to explain is the hallmark of quality: 
the opposition between description and explanation is another of these false dichotomies 
that should be put to rest … If a description remains in need of an explanation, it means that 
it is a bad description. (Latour, 2005: 137) 
Descriptions matter, they are a key tool in the construction of knowledge, they confer weight, 
involve interpretation and bestow meaning.  The analysis above shows the import of descriptions 
where there is a struggle for understanding, and the processes by which their content is shaped.  For 
the author, this involves the relationship between knowledge, observation, and interpretation, the 
author’s positionality and how this frames perception.  But further, descriptions are shaped by 
where and to whom they are presented, and their strength derives in part from their circulation and 
collectivity.  
Analysing the Morecambe Bay Investigation report has shown the contest of views at play between 
individuals and collectives, those on the inside and the outside, and lay and professional.  Looking at 
how descriptions were put together, and attempts to stop them being put together, the Morecambe 
Bay Investigation illustrates some important features of descriptions when establishing failures of 
healthcare.  Taking their epistemic origin – lay or professional – first; the interplay was more 
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complex than one pitted against the other.  Professional knowledge is still authoritative knowledge, 
but it is not beyond challenge; the direct experience of Titcombe’s account was far more persuasive 
than the midwives’ which drew considerable scepticism.  Nor were professional and lay views always 
in contest; there were criticisms from professionals as well as relatives: the obstetrician who raised 
concerns, the Strategic Health Authority officer who questioned whether the five SUIs were fully 
understood, the coroner, and the inquiry panel.  The significance in each case is how individuals 
were positioned and the audience they addressed. The obstetrician and the Strategic Health 
Authority officer addressed a limited audience of senior management within the Trust resulting in no 
change to the predominant perspective, whereas the coroner and the inquiry panel addressed a 
wider public audience and were more consequential in shifting the predominant perspective.  
Next, the position from where the descriptions emerged was largely (although not exclusively) 
organised around internal and external perspectives.  In short, external perspectives were more 
likely to be critical, but terms of reference and sources of information fundamentally limited their 
vision.  The external review by a midwife, obstetrician and paediatrician identified some failures of 
care but criticism was limited by only having access to medical records and staff statements.  The 
Fielding Review’s potential for criticism was circumvented by shifting the terms of reference away 
from exploring a connection between the five SUIs.  Externality of perspective is not always enough, 
external control over the investigation’s remit or terms of reference is essential, as with the inquests 
and inquiry.  Again, it seems, audience is key; the descriptions most effective at establishing failures 
in care were those that allowed public scrutiny – inquests, media reporting and social media 
campaigns, and inquiries. 
Lastly, if descriptions are to hold, they must create a shared perspective. Collectivity defends against 
the charge that it is one view against another.  The case above illustrates the importance of making 
detailed knowledge of events accessible to the public, and the processes that allowed a collective 
viewpoint to develop – inquests, social media campaigns, and the inquiry.  These were critical in 
shifting the received view that the SUIs were unconnected, but public debate and the exposure it 
involves come at a personal cost to all concerned.  
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i Supervisors of midwives are experienced midwives who have undergone additional training to provide 
support and guidance to practising midwives.  In 2008, they also had a regulatory function, investigating 
complaints.  This changed in 2017 to separate support for midwives from their regulation.  Midwifery referrals 
are now dealt with directly by the NMC. 
ii I’m using Mr James Titcombe’s actual name here as it was such a high-profile case it seems nonsensical not 
to, but it would also be disingenuous not to do so as Mr Titcombe had to work exceedingly hard to be heard 
and since these events, he has been passionate, vocal, spokesperson on matters of patient safety and 
continues to work in this field.  In 2013 he was appointed by the CQC as the National Advisor on Safety, and in 
2015 he was awarded an OBE for services to patient safety.  He now works as Associate Editor of the Journal of 
Patient Safety and Risk Management.  He is also the author of Joshua’s Story, cited in the references. 
                                                          
